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This article describes and evaluates 2014 Czech European Parliament (EP) election. Starting with the context of the election, it goes through all relevant party actors participating in the election and introduces them both in general ideological terms as well as in relation towards the European integration. After results of election are discussed, the article concludes that 2014 EP election confirmed recent changes in the Czech party system – inter alia destabilization of the system as a whole, reconfiguration on its right wing and emergence of populism. Concerning the European message of the election, their results confirmed their second-order character. ; This article describes and evaluates 2014 Czech European Parliament (EP) election. Starting with the context of the election, it goes through all relevant party actors participating in the election and introduces them both in general ideological terms as well as in relation towards the European integration. After results of election are discussed, the article concludes that 2014 EP election confirmed recent changes in the Czech party system – inter alia destabilization of the system as a whole, reconfiguration on its right wing and emergence of populism. Concerning the European message of the election, their results confirmed their second-order character.

Based on an analysis of several EU Presidencies, Swe dish political scientist Jonas Tallberg created a model that identifies ways in wh ich EU Presidency countries shape the EU agenda. In this model, Tallberg concep tualises the process of agenda shaping in a broader way and particularly focuses o n structuring issues that are already a part of the EU political agenda. Tallberg argues that there are three relevant dimensions – the socioeconomic, the region al and the constitutional – according to which the Presidency structures its po litical preferences. However, Tallberg did not work with consistent data (for example, presidency priorities on EU legislation) and his model is less than comprehensive. Additionally, Tallberg model was created in the context of the EU – 15. By analysing the Czech EU Presidency of 2009 and its legislative priorities, this article a ddresses both shortcomings of the model and applies it to the EU – 27 context. As its main findings, the analysis confirms that Tallberg model is valid when applied to a single EU Presidency and a consistent dataset (legislative priorities) and offers an optimisation of the model. The analysis also confirms Tallberg model is valid for the new EU Member States. ; Based on an analysis of several EU Presidencies, Swe dish political scientist Jonas Tallberg created a model that identifies ways in wh ich EU Presidency countries shape the EU agenda. In this model, Tallberg concep tualises the process of agenda shaping in a broader way and particularly focuses o n structuring issues that are already a part of the EU political agenda. Tallberg argues that there are three relevant dimensions – the socioeconomic, the region al and the constitutional – according to which the Presidency structures its po litical preferences. However, Tallberg did not work with consistent data (for exa mple, presidency priorities on EU legislation) and his model is less than comprehensive. Additionally, Tallberg model was created in the context of the EU – 15. By analy sing the Czech EU Presidency of 2009 and its legislative priorities, this article a ddresses both shortcomings of the model and applies it to the EU – 27 context. As its main findings, the analysis confirms that Tallberg model is valid when applied to a single EU Presidency and a consistent dataset (legislative priorities) and offers an optimisation of the model. The analysis also confirms Tallberg model is valid for the new EU Member States.

The European Parliament elections in 2014 and 2019 were different insofar as European citizens had the possibility to 'directly' influence who could become the next president of the European Commission. This innovation is based on the idea of 'Spitzenkandidaten', where a vote for a given political party also represents a vote for its lead candidate. This article examines the process behind the institutionalisation of the Spitzenkandidaten procedure, with attention focused on the actors involved and their motivations for supporting this institutional innovation. Using a qualitative content analysis of EU institutional and party documentation, the article confirms that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure should be perceived as the culmination of a long-term process beginning in the pre-Amsterdam era. It also concludes that the procedure, as firstly applied in 2014, represents the common effort of two supranational institutions and four European political parties. It is also argued that while the emergence of the Spitzenkandidaten is primarily a result of perceived shortcomings of the EU's democratic quality, actors' self-interest was also driving force.

Parliamentary questions are a direct form of parliamentary scrutiny of other EU institutions and bodies, traditionally being an important tool for the opposition. This study examines how parliamentary questions are used in the European Parliament. We ascertain whether political groups representing opposition differ in their use of parliamentary questions from those who are represented in the European Commission. The article presents two main findings. First, such a difference does exist in all types of questions at the aggregated level. Groups not represented in the European Commission pose more questions than those who are represented. Secondly, it appears that the type of parliamentary question determines the groups' behaviour. The article thus contributes to our understanding of how opposition functions in the European Parliament.

The EU decision-making system is a unique combination of the power of the states and supranational institutions. The relationship between the institutions and the states allows us to establish several competing theoretical explanations while trying to describe and explain this mutual relationship. One of the most influential theoretical explanations is the institutionalism of rational choice and the associated principal – agent model. This article is based on the analysis of the youngest EU advisory body, the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The article examines the evolution of the relationship between principal (Member states) and agent (CoR) and the trend that can be observed in this process. ; The EU decision-making system is a unique combination of the power of the states and supranational institutions. The relationship between the institutions and the states allows us to establish several competing theoretical explanations while trying to describe and explain this mutual relationship. One of the most influential theoretical explanations is the institutionalism of rational choice and the associated principal – agent model. This article is based on the analysis of the youngest EU advisory body, the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The article examines the evolution of the relationship between principal (Member states) and agent (CoR) and the trend that can be observed in this process.

The EU Presidency has been so far studied especially in terms of its EU impact and influence while neglecting its potential impact at the domestic level. This article, dealing with the Czech EU Presidency of 2009, focuses on this domestic dimension. Based upon more than 30 elite interviews with civil servants and official documents, it analyses the possible impact of the EU Presidency on state administration and attempts to analyse such influence in the framework of Europeanisation. As a conclusion, the article proposes paying attention to coordination and the institutional structures processing EU affairs as the first possible indicator, and human resources as the second one. Concerning the particular Czech case, the assessed medium impact of the Presidency was affected by political instability in the country and the overall weak stability of the Czech state bureaucracy. ; The EU Presidency has been so far studied especially in terms of its EU impact and influence while neglecting its potential impact at the domestic level. This article, dealing with the Czech EU Presidency of 2009, focuses on this domestic dimension. Based upon more than 30 elite interviews with civil servants and official documents, it analyses the possible impact of the EU Presidency on state administration and attempts to analyse such influence in the framework of Europeanisation. As a conclusion, the article proposes paying attention to coordination and the institutional structures processing EU affairs as the first possible indicator, and human resources as the second one. Concerning the particular Czech case, the assessed medium impact of the Presidency was affected by political instability in the country and the overall weak stability of the Czech state bureaucracy.

EU Council working groups still represent a topic that is neglected in EU research. If they are analysed, the effect of socialisation is particularly tested while rationally motivated factors such as a Left-Right position, green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) and traditionalism/authority/nationalism (TAN) positions or approaches towards the EU are left aside. This article analyses how such factors shape the member states' oral communication at the working groups level. Based on a dataset gathered by non-participatory observation of interventions, the analysis suggests that none of the rationally constructed variables plays a significant role in shaping the audible communication of representatives of the EU member states. The article thus confirms the effect of socialisation on oral communication as well as the influence of structural factors such as member states' power and the character of the document under discussion.

There are two competing perceptions of the EU Council and its working groups. The first of them argues that the Council works as a battleground for expressing the interests of Member States and other participating actors. A competing view emphasizes the effects of socialization and informal norm shaping behaviour of the actors involved. It thus considers the Council as a forum where consensus prevails. This article analyses how different actors acting in the Council working groups communicate in a formal way. Based upon analysis of non-participatory observation of interventions, it finds that working groups tend to be arenas for real bargaining where the actors enforce their interests. It also finds that even the Council Presidency focuses on interests' promotion and that socialization – which can be found at the COREPER level – does not take place in the working groups.

This report analyses national parliament participation in the decision-making of the EU and evaluates how the national parliaments as a collective actor have performed thus far. It explains the collective scrutiny mechanisms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. After that, it provides an analysis of the methods and mechanisms that exist in EU member states for collective parliamentary scrutiny and in more details looks at the praxis of this oversight in 5 EU member states. The fifth part of the study is devoted to the analysis of how collective scrutiny has functioned since the Lisbon Treaty came into force (1 January 2010) up to the end of 2014 (31 December 2014). It is based on the author's own dataset of EU legislative items which were sent to national parliaments and their chambers for scrutiny during the analysed period. The last section is devoted to a final summary of the results. Part of the conclusion is also a sub-chapter dealing with the dimension of policy advising. Its goal is to provide a recommendation for the future role of national parliaments as a collective actor in European integration.

When, in the beginning of 2009, the Party of Free Citizens was founded, it was believed that the main impulse for establishing a new political party was the generally positive approach towards the Lisbon Treaty adopted by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) a couple of months before. Thus, since its foundation, the media, commentators and political analysts have labelled the Party of Free Citizens as a single issue Eurosceptic party. This article challenges this prevailing evaluation of the Party of Free Citizens and subsequently confronts the party´s programs and press releases with three concepts – the concept of Euroscepticism connected with the work of Taggart and Szczerbiak, the concept of a single issue party developed by Mudde, and the concept of a niche party brought into political science by Meguide. The article concludes that while the Party of Free Citizens is undoubtedly a Eurosceptic party, both in terms of its soft and hard versions, its overall performance as a political entity does not meet the criteria of Mudde´s concept of a single issue party. As the Party of Free Citizens puts a strong emphasis on European issues (compared to other mainstream Czech political parties), it can, at most, be described as a niche party.